The objective of the paper is to propose endogenous debt constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo et al. (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independent of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model.
Introduction
One of the main difficulties of extending financial market economies to an infinite horizon is related to the existence of the so-called Ponzi schemes. In the absence of a terminal date, agents would attempt to finance unbounded levels of consumption by renewing their credit at infinity. If such schemes are permitted, the agent's decision problem has no solution. Therefore, without debt constraints that limit the rate at which agents accumulate debt, equilibria fail to exist.
Broadly speaking three approaches have been proposed in the literature to deal with the specification of debt constraints in infinite horizon sequential market models. The main difference among these lines of research hinges on the specific assumptions made about the enforcement of payments as well as the proposed default punishment.
The first approach, due to Magill and Quinzii (1994) , Hernández and Santos (1996) and Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002) ), introduces debt constraints in economies where payments are fully enforced and therefore there is no default (even on out of equilibrium paths). Magill and Quinzii (1994) argue in favor of implicit debt constraints that restrict budget sets to include portfolios whose value is a bounded sequence along the event tree. An interesting property of equilibria with implicit debt constraints is that it is always possible to find uniform bounds on the value of short-sales which are non-binding at those equilibria. Moreover, under reasonable assumptions on preferences, equilibria with implicit debt constraints coincide with equilibria with transversality type conditions that are often imposed in macroeconomic models (see Blanchard and Fisher (1989) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) ). Hernández and Santos (1996) argue in favor of debt constraints that impose a kind of solvency requirement. Households are allowed to borrow against their current value of future endowment streams. When markets are incomplete, traders may not agree on current value prices. Hernández and Santos (1996) propose a special way of computing 0304-4068/$ -see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.006 current value prices that takes into account the whole set of non-arbitrage price systems. Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002) ) offer an alternative formulation of the solvency requirement. They formalize debt constraints that induce agents to repay their debt in finite time, that is, the suggested debt constraints are finitely effective. Stated differently, finitely effective constraints induce agents to choose plans that are budget compatible with the threat that, at any period, they may be restricted to have access to borrowing only for a finite number of periods. Finitely effective debt constraints provide a general characterization of debt constraints that are compatible with equilibrium. More precisely, Levine and Zame (1996) have shown that any loose and consistent system of debt constraints that rules out Ponzi schemes and ensures the existence of an equilibrium reduces to be finitely effective. 1 The second approach, due to Kehoe and Levine (1993) (see also Kehoe and Levine (2001) ), Zhang (1997) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , explores debt constraints in economies where commitment is limited and there is a severe punishment for default: if agents do not honor their debts, they are excluded from participating in the asset markets in future periods. In such a setting the authors argue for self-enforcing constraints that are tight enough to prevent default at equilibrium but simultaneously are loose enough to allow for as much risk sharing as possible.
The third and most recent approach to deal with Ponzi schemes also considers models with limited commitment. However, contrary to self-enforcing borrowing constraints (à la Alvarez and Jermann (2000) ) that prevent default at equilibrium, this research line addresses the issue of Ponzi schemes in economies where default may be consistent with equilibrium. It is motivated by the empirical observation that modern economies experience a substantial amount of default and bankruptcy.
2 One of the most important and widespread means of securing loans and lowering the level of default in financial markets is collateral.
3 Araujo et al. (2002) (see also Kubler and Schmedders (2003) ) showed that, without imposing any system of debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in economies where collateral is the only mechanism that enforces agents to (partially) pay their debts. The intuition behind their result is as follows: combining short-sales with the purchase of collateral constitutes a joint operation that yields non-negative returns.
4 By nonarbitrage, at equilibrium, the price of the collateral exceeds the price of the asset, implying that collateral costs exceed the value 1 See also Hernández and Santos (1996) for a similar discussion.
2 Nowadays, there is a vast literature on default that dates back to the seminal contributions of Shubik (1972) , Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey and Shubik (1979) . Default was introduced in a general equilibrium setting by Dubey et al. (1990) and Zame (1993) . Modern theoretical contributions on default include among others, Dubey et al. (1995) , Geanakoplos (1997) , Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) , Araujo et al. (2002) , Kubler and Schmedders (2003) , Dubey et al. (2005) , Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) , Páscoa and Seghir (2009) and Ferreira and TorresMartínez (2010) . There are also important contributions on default, collateral and credit constraints in macroeconomics (see Bernanke et al. (1996) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) ). This literature emphasizes the feedback from the fall in collateral prices to a fall in borrowing capacity. Recently, Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits et al. (2007) have calibrated macroeconomic models with incomplete markets and default and used them to address various policy issues.
3 Collateral-using activities have expanded rapidly in recent years. Financial institutions extensively employ collateral in lending, in securities' trading and derivative markets and in payment and settlement systems. Central banks generally require collateral in their credit operations. Common examples of collateralized lending are home mortgages, margin purchases of securities, overnight repurchase agreements and pawn shop loans. 4 Since there is no other punishment than the seizure of collateral, borrowers will always deliver the minimum between their promises and the value of the associated collateral requirements.
of loans. Therefore, it becomes impossible to pay a previous debt by issuing new debt. In most of the economic systems, collateral is not the only mean of securing loans. The default option usually entails additional economic consequences.
5 This explains the fact that even in the midst of the most severe housing downturn on record, many households with negative equity choose to continue meeting their financial obligations (see, e.g., Gerardi et al. (2007 Gerardi et al. ( , 2009 ) and Gerardi et al. (2008)) .
One approach to model additional enforcement mechanisms is to introduce linear utility penalties (see Dubey et al. (1990) , Zame (1993) and Dubey et al. (2005) and the literature cited therein). These penalties might be interpreted as the consequences (directly assessed in terms of utility) of some third party punishment such as prison terms and pangs of conscience, and/or of some nonmodeled economic punishment such as exclusion from credit markets and garnishing of future income.
A surprising result found by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) is that the introduction of default penalties in the model of Araujo et al. (2002) may induce payments besides the value of the collateral and lead to the reappearance of Ponzi schemes. The intuition is simple: when penalties are severe, agents have incentives to repay more than the value of the depreciated collateral. In this case, the joint operation of combining short-sales with the purchase of collateral no longer yields non-negative returns. Therefore, loans may exceed collateral costs and agents may run Ponzi schemes.
One may think that the reappearance of Ponzi schemes is related to the particular additional enforcement mechanism (linear utility penalties) Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have considered. However, Ferreira and Torres-Martínez (2010) showed that, for sufficiently low collateral requirements, any effective additional enforcement mechanism implies the non-existence of physically feasible optimal plans.
6 That is, any effective additional enforcement mechanism gives rise to Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies. Hence, it is the effectiveness of the mechanism that induces agents to run a Ponzi scheme, not the mechanism per se.
Given the findings of Seghir (2009) and Ferreira and Torres-Martínez (2010) we propose to answer the following question: what kind of borrowing constraints rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of equilibria in models with limited commitment and (possible) default at equilibrium? As a first step to provide an answer to this question, it is natural to investigate whether debt constraints that have been proposed in models with full commitment can be compatible with equilibrium existence in models with limited commitment. The paper is an attempt to address this issue. It shows that finitely effective debt constraints, similar to those proposed by Levine and Zame (1996) in environments with full commitment, ensure equilibrium existence in the models of Araujo et al. (2002) , Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) where commitment is limited.
A direct adaptation of finitely effective debt constraints à la Levine and Zame (1996) in those environments does not help to control debt along time. The reason is that when commitment is limited, an agent can always satisfy his budget restrictions having access to financial markets for a finite number of periods.
5 For instance, if an agent files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code, the following things may happen (see Chatterjee et al. (2007) ):
(1) he is not allowed to save and his existing savings will be completely garnished; (2) he has to pay a proportion of the current income as cost of filling for bankruptcy; (3) a proportion of his current labor income is garnished; (4) his credit history turns bad and he is excluded from the loan market.
6 An enforcement mechanism is said to be effective if it entails payments besides the value of the collateral at all nodes of a subtree.
He can do this by simply defaulting on his promises. Therefore, requiring finite-time solvency à la Levine and Zame (1996) does not restrict budget sets. In particular, it does not exclude Ponzi schemes. We address this issue by modifying appropriately the definition of finitely effective debt constraints to encompass economies with limited commitment and (possible) default at equilibrium. Working in this direction, we impose debt constraints by introducing in the setting of Araujo et al. (2002) , Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. An interesting finding is that there is a close relation between our proposed budget sets and the budget sets of Levine and Zame (1996) as well as the budget sets defined through collateral obligations and no additional punishments (Araujo et al., 2002; Kubler and Schmedders, 2003) . First, our proposed debt constraints provide a natural formulation of Levine and Zame (1996) solvency requirement in those models. When there is full commitment (and payments are fully enforced), our concept of plans with finitely equivalent payoffs coincides with the concept of plans with finitely effective debts introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) . Second and most important, we show that the budget feasible plans in economies with a collateral structure and zero default penalties have finite equivalent payoffs and vice versa. In other words, when there are collateral requirements but no default penalties, our budget set coincides with the standard one defined in Araujo et al. (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) . This equivalence is valid for any price process (i.e., not only at equilibrium but also on out of equilibrium paths) and illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.
Our approach to debt constraints is certainly not the only one possible. Instead of adapting the restrictions proposed by Levine and Zame (1996) , one may follow another route by considering restrictions in the spirit of Magill and Quinzii (1994) or Hernández and Santos (1996) . However, it is not clear whether those borrowing constraints would be innocuous in models with collateral requirements and zero default penalties as it is the case for the constraints we propose. In that respect, we believe that modifying the approach of Levine and Zame (1996) to control debt is more suitable for models with limited commitment and collateral requirements.
Proposing any kind of debt constraints raises an equally important issue: how difficult is to implement those constraints in anonymous and competitive markets. In the context of full commitment, Magill and Quinzii (1994) give two possible interpretations of their implicit debt constraints: a subjective (selfmonitoring) interpretation where agents restrict themselves to satisfy these constraints and an objective (market based) one where an external agent (an agency) has the ability to restrict agents to choose plans satisfying the borrowing constraints. In our context of limited commitment, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs can be given a similar interpretation. This is due to the fact that, under mild conditions on primitives, equilibria with finite equivalent payoffs are equilibria with implicit (or explicit and non-binding) constraints on short-selling. 7 In particular, one can show that there exists a threshold bound related only to primitives (aggregate resources) of the economy such that any posted bound greater than this threshold will be non-binding at equilibrium.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set out the model, introduce notation, assumptions and the equilibrium 7 Our bounds (implicit or explicit) are different than those imposed by Magill and Quinzii (1994) . Our bounds restrict short sales while theirs restrict the real value of debt. concept in the absence of borrowing constraints. In Section 3, we present and discuss the new debt constraints we impose on budget feasible plans. We also introduce an equilibrium concept associated with those constraints and highlight its relation with the equilibrium concepts introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) and Araujo et al. (2002) . Section 4 proves the existence of what we term equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs under a mild condition on default penalties. In Section 5, we discuss equilibrium refinement and highlight a problem that has been overlooked by the literature. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The model is essentially the one developed in Araujo et al. (2002) and extended by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) to allow for the possibility of linear default penalties.
Uncertainty and time
Let T ≡ {0, 1, . . . , t, . . .} denote the set of time periods and let S be a (infinite) set of states of nature. The available information at period t ∈ T is the same for each agent and is described by a finite partition P t of S. Information is revealed along time, i.e., the partition P t+1 is finer than P t for every t. Every pair (t, σ ) where σ is a set in P t is called a node. The set of all nodes is denoted by D and is called the event tree. We assume that there is no information at t = 0 and we denote by ξ 0 = (0, S) the initial node. If ξ = (t, σ ) belongs to the event tree, then t is denoted by t(ξ ). We say that ξ 
+ is purchased at node ξ − . We say that the commodity ℓ is perishable at node ξ − if Y (ξ )1 {ℓ} is the zero vector in R L + , and non-perishable otherwise. At each node there are spot markets for trading every commodity.
We let p = (p(ξ )) ξ ∈D be the spot price process where p(ξ ) = (p(ξ , ℓ)) ℓ∈L ∈ R L + is the price vector at node ξ . There is a finite set I of infinitely lived agents. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by an endowment process ω is assumed to be additively separable, i.e.,
Assets and collateral
There is a finite set J of short-lived real financial assets available for trade at each node. For each asset j, the bundle yielded at node ξ is denoted by A(ξ , j) ∈ R L + . We let q = (q(ξ )) ξ ∈D be the asset price process where q(ξ ) = (q(ξ , j)) j∈J ∈ R J + represents the asset price vector at node ξ . We denote by θ i (ξ ) ∈ R J + the vector of purchases and by ϕ i (ξ ) ∈ R J + the vector of short-sales at each node ξ .
Following the seminal contribution of Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) for finite horizon models, and Araujo et al. (2002) together with Páscoa and Seghir (2009) for infinite horizon models, assets are collateralized in the sense that for every unit of asset j sold at a node ξ , agents should buy a collateral bundle C (ξ , j) ∈ R L + that protects lenders in case of default. We assume that payments can be enforced through the seizure of the collateral. At a node ξ , agent i should deliver the promise
However, agent i may decide to default and choose a delivery d i (ξ , j) in units of account. Since the collateral can be seized, this delivery must satisfy
where
Remark 2.1. Kubler and Schmedders (2003) propose a model where the collateral requirements are imposed in terms of physical assets. We show hereafter that a simplified version of their model can be seen as a particular case of the model proposed by Araujo et al. (2002) . In that respect whenever we are referring to the model proposed by Araujo et al. (2002) we are also referring to the one proposed by Kubler and Schmedders (2003) .
If there is a specific commodity g ∈ L satisfying the following properties, then this commodity can be interpreted as a physical asset or a Lucas tree.
(i) At initial node ξ 0 , each agent i has an initial endowment ω i (ξ 0 , g) 0 of commodity g which represents his share of the tree. At subsequent nodes ξ > ξ 0 , agent i has no initial endowment in commodity g.
(ii) One unit of commodity g purchased at node ξ delivers at node µ ∈ ξ + the bundle
The g-th coordinate y(µ, g) is equal to 1, i.e., the physical asset is long lived. (iii) Each agent i is indifferent with respect to commodity g, i.e., for
(iv) In every successor node µ ∈ ξ + , the transformed bundle of one unit of commodity g purchased at any node ξ , is a desirable bundle, i.e.,
8 Since each agent i is indifferent with respect to commodity g, the bundle delivered by the tree must satisfy y(µ, ℓ) > 0 for at least one commodity ℓ ̸ = g.
If at every node ξ ∈ D, the collateral bundle C (ξ , j) is only in terms of commodity g, then the collateral structure of our model (and the one in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) ) reduces to the one considered by Kubler and Schmedders (2003) .
Following Dubey et al. (1990 ) (and Dubey et al. (2005 ), we assume that agent i feels a disutility λ i (ξ , j) ∈ [0, +∞] from defaulting.
9 More precisely, if an agent defaults at node ξ , then he suffers at t = 0, the disutility
where (v(ξ )) ξ ∈D is an exogenously specified process in R L ++ that is uniformly bounded away from 0.
10 In that case, agent i may have an incentive to deliver more than the minimum between his debt and the depreciated value of his collateral, i.e., we may have d
As in Dubey et al. (2005) assets are thought as pools. At each node ξ the sales ϕ i (ξ , j) are pooled at the market for asset j. The deliveries d i (ξ , j) on asset j are also pooled and the buyers of pool j receive a pro rata share of all its different sellers' deliveries. We assume that lenders rationally anticipate that every borrower delivers at least D(p, ξ , j) on each unit of asset j sold at node ξ − . Therefore, agents anticipate that each share of pool j delivers a
where κ(ξ , j) ∈ [0, 1] will be determined at equilibrium such that deliveries match payments.
11 The buyer of asset j does not need to know the identities of the sellers or the quantities of their sales. All that matters to him is the price q(ξ , j) and the anticipated delivery rates (κ(µ, j)) µ∈ξ + .
Budget set without debt constraints
Let A be the space of adapted processes a = (a(ξ )) ξ ∈D with
Given a process (p, q, κ) of commodity prices, asset prices and
(a) solvency constraint:
( 2.3)
The set of plans a = (x, θ , ϕ, d) ∈ A satisfying constraints (2.1)-(2.3) is called the (unconstrained) budget set and is denoted by B i (p, q, κ).
9 Models with non-pecuniary penalties for default also include Diamond (1984) ; Rea (1984) , who considers contracts involving ''arm-breaking'', Zame (1993) , Araujo et al. (1998) , Bisin and Gottardi (1999) , Santos and Scheinkman (2001) , Lacker (2001) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) .
10 More precisely, we assume that there exists v > 0 such that for every node ξ ∈ D and every commodity ℓ ∈ L, we have v(ξ , ℓ) v.
11 If all the sellers of asset j at node ξ − fully deliver on their promises at the successor node ξ then κ(ξ , j) = 1, while if all sellers fully default on their promises then κ(ξ , j) = 0.
12 By convention we pose a(ξ
The payoff function
Consider that agent i has chosen the plan a = (x, θ , ϕ, d) under a process of prices and delivery rates π = (p, q, κ).
13 He enjoys the utility
We would like to define the payoff Π i (p, a) of the plan a as the following difference 
According to this definition, a plan a is strictly preferred to a if the 
We denote by Pref i (p, a) the set of plans strictly preferred to plan a by agent i.
Assumptions
For each agent i, we denote by Ω i the process of accumulated endowments, defined recursively by
accumulated aggregate endowments is denoted by Ω. The following assumptions on the characteristics of the economy are standard in the literature of infinite horizon models with collateral requirements.
Assumption 2.1 (Agents). For every agent i, (H.1) the process of accumulated endowments is strictly positive and uniformly bounded from above, i.e., 
It should be clear that these assumptions always hold throughout the paper.
Equilibrium without debt constraints
We denote by Ξ the set of prices and delivery rates (p, q, κ) normalized as follows: for every node ξ , we have
Given a process (p, q, κ) of commodity prices, asset prices and delivery rates, we denote by d i (p, q, κ) the demand set defined by
Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium for the economy E is a family of prices and delivery rates (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and an allocation a = (a i ) i∈I with a i ∈ A such that (a) for every agent i, the plan a i is optimal, i.e.,
(b) commodity markets clear at every node, i.e.,
and for all ξ ̸ = ξ 0 ,
(2.5) (c) asset markets clear at every node, i.e., for all ξ ∈ D,
(2.6) (d) deliveries match at every node, i.e., for all ξ ̸ = ξ 0 and all j ∈ J,
The set of allocations a = (a i ) i∈I in A satisfying the market i . The set of physically feasible plans is denoted by F i . We denote by Eq(E ) the set of competitive equilibria for the economy E .
Debt constraints
In this section, we show how to adapt the finitely effective debt constraints proposed by Levine and Zame (1996) to infinite horizon models with limited commitment and default penalties. While keeping the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model, we prove that the proposed constraints are compatible with equilibrium (precluding agents to run Ponzi schemes). Moreover, our constraints appear to have an additional appealing feature: we show that the budget sets associated with those constraints coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo et al. (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) ).
Infinite default penalties
When default penalties are infinite and the collateral requirements are zero, our model reduces to the one studied by Magill and Quinzii (1994) and Levine and Zame (1996) . In the absence of debt 16 In the sense that
constraints, an equilibrium may not exist: all traders would attempt to finance unbounded levels of consumption by unbounded levels of borrowing. To rule out Ponzi schemes, Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002) ) formalize the concept of plans with finitely effective debts by requiring agents' actions to be budget compatible with the threat that, at any period, agents may be restricted to have access to borrowing for only a finite number of periods. In other words, an agent's debt is finitely effective if at any period, the debt is repayable within a finite horizon. More formally, we consider the following definition due to Levine and Zame (1996) . 
(ii) at every node after period T , there is solvency without borrowing, i.e.,
The intuition behind Definition 3.1 can be better understood if we think about the role of those restrictions in the finite horizon framework. No short selling at the terminal date implicitly imposes a solvency requirement at earlier dates. That is, at any node agents should hold an amount of debt that they will be able to repay by the end of the terminal date. In the absence of a terminal date, it is necessary to impose explicitly or implicitly that solvency requirement.
Remark 3.1. Consider the following notation. For each period t, we denote by A t the set of plans a ∈ A where a(ξ ) = (0, 0, 0, 0) for each ξ such that t(ξ ) > t. If a is a plan in A and t is a period, we denote by a1 [0,t] 
and a1 [0,t] =  a1 [0,t] where C T is the set of plans a in A without borrowing after period T in the sense that
Instead of restricting plans to be finitely effective, one may consider the following alternative restriction. have finite equivalent utilities when for every period t 0 and every ε > 0 there exists a subsequent period T > t and a plan a such that (i) the plans a and a coincide up to period t, i.e., a1 [0,t] =  a1 [0,t] ; (ii) the plan  a is budget feasible and there is no borrowing after period T , i.e., a ∈ B i (p, q, κ) ∩ C T ;
(iii) the utility of the plan a may be lower than the payoff of a but not more than ε, i.e.,
In other words, a budget feasible plan a has finite equivalent utilities if in case where at some period t the agent is restricted to have access to borrowing for finitely many periods, then he can find an alternative plan a doing the job, i.e., satisfying (i) and (ii); but at the same time the utility loss can be made as small as desired.
The following proposition shows the equivalence between plans with finitely effective debts and plans having finite equivalent utilities. This alternative characterization will be proven particularly useful in the process of modifying finitely effective constraints to encompass models with limited commitment. 
Unfortunately, we do not know if
we know that the utility U i (x) is finite. Therefore, there exists t
Now, applying the definition of finitely effective debt for the period t ′ , there exist a period T > t ′ and a plan a such that
Finite default penalties
The concept of finitely effective debt constraints makes perfect sense in models with full enforcement and perfect commitment (i.e., no default). However, with limited commitment, imposing finitely effective debt constraints does not help to control debt along time. We provide an explanation below. Let a = (x, θ , ϕ, d) be a plan in B i (p, q, κ) and t be any period. Consider the plan  a defined by
This plan belongs to the set B i (p, q, κ) ∩ C t+1 and coincides with a on every node up to period t. That is, under limited commitment, any plan a ∈ B i (p, q, κ) has finitely effective debts according to Definition 3.1. Agents can always default up to the minimum value between their debt and the depreciated value of their collateral. Therefore, there is no hope to bound debt along time.
We introduce hereafter an endogenous restriction on trades that allows to encompass models with limited commitment and finite default penalties. The point of our departure is Proposition 3.1 where it is shown that, when default penalties are infinite, restricting plans to have finitely effective debts is equivalent to restricting plans to have finite equivalent utilities. This equivalence breaks down in the presence of finite default penalties. In this case, we proceed by replacing ''utility'' by ''payoff'' and we introduce the concept of plans with finite equivalent payoffs. We claim that requiring plans to have finite equivalent payoffs provides an appropriate adaptation of finitely effective debt constraints to models with limited commitment and finite default penalties. The formal definition is as follows. Definition 3.3. A plan a in the budget set B i (p, q, κ) has finite equivalent payoffs if for every period t 0 and every ε > 0 there exist a subsequent period T > t and a plan a such that (i) the plans a and a coincide up to period t, i.e., a1 [0,t] =  a1 [0,t] ; (ii) the plan  a is budget feasible and there is no borrowing after period
(iii ′ ) the payoff of the plan  a may be lower than the payoff of the initial plan a but not more than ε, i.e.,
The interpretation of a plan with finite equivalent payoffs is similar to the one of a plan with finite equivalent utilities. The only difference is that we replace ''utility'' by ''payoff''. This is very intuitive since agents may suffer a loss in utility when defaulting. We denote by Eq ⋆ (E) the set of competitive equilibria with finite equivalent payoffs for the economy E . We prove in Section 4.3 that the set Eq ⋆ (E) is non-empty under a mild condition on default penalties. Before addressing the existence issue, we explore hereafter the relation between the equilibrium concept that we have just introduced and the one found in Araujo et al. (2002) .
Equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs

No default penalty
We consider the case where collateral repossession is the only enforcement mechanism and that default penalties are equal to zero as in Araujo et al. (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) . One may expect B i ⋆ (p, q, κ) to be a strict subset of B i (p, q, κ). However, as the following proposition shows, the two sets coincide. In fact, in the model proposed by Araujo et al. (2002) , any budget feasible allocation with a finite utility has finite equivalent payoffs. This is a consequence of the absence of default penalties or explicit economic punishments. 
Consider now the plan a defined by
Observe that the plan  a is budget feasible, belongs to C T and satisfies
T . Since T − 1 t, in order to prove that the plan a has finite equivalent payoffs, we need to compare U i,τ ( x ) and U i,τ (x).
Observe that
We have thus proved that the plan a has finite equivalent payoffs.
A direct implication of the last proposition is that, when there is no loss of utility in case of default, the sets Eq(E ) and Eq ⋆ (E)
coincide. This observation allows us to obtain the existence result of Araujo et al. (2002) as a direct corollary of our equilibrium existence result (see Section 4). 
Proposition 3.3. If there is no default penalty then (π , a) is a competitive equilibrium, if and only if, it is a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., the sets
Consider the plan a defined by
Since the plan  a ∈ B i (p, q, κ) and U i ( x ) < ∞, Proposition 3.2 implies that it has finite equivalent payoffs, i.e.,  a ∈ B i ⋆ (p, q, κ).
Moreover we have
This contradicts the optimality of a i in B i ⋆ (p, q, κ). Levine and Zame (1996) proved that finitely effective debt constraints are compatible with equilibrium when the default penalty is infinite and no collateral is required. We argued in the previous section that a reasonable adaptation of those endogenous borrowing constraints to models with limited commitment is to restrict plans to have finite equivalent payoffs. We formally defined the concept of equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs and we have shown its relation with respect to the equilibrium concepts found in the papers of Araujo et al. (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) . In this section, we are concerned with the issue of existence of such equilibria. We show that if agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, restricting actions to have finite equivalent payoffs allows to rule out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. Myopia in our setting refers to the time preference of default: the disutility of defaulting today is greater than the disutility of defaulting in the distant future and vanishes in the long run. In other words, myopia implies a reasonable restriction on the asymptotic behavior of default penalties. We exhibit below a large class of ''standard'' economies for which agents are myopic with respect to default penalties.
Precluding Ponzi schemes
Myopia with respect to default penalties
Before introducing the formal definition of myopic agents with respect to default penalties, we need to introduce some notations.
For each asset j and node ξ , we denote by M(ξ , j) the real number
which corresponds to the maximum amount of short-sales in asset j at node ξ that is consistent with the equilibrium condition of market clearing. Observe that under Assumption 2.2, we have
The quantity H(ξ , j) is the maximum amount in real terms that an agent may default on every unit of asset j he sold short at the preceding node ξ − . Indeed, it is straightforward to verify that if 
Definition 4.1. Agent i is said to be myopic with respect to default penalties if the disutility suffered at the initial period from defaulting in the long run is negligible, i.e., lim inf
Agent i is said to be uniformly myopic with respect to default penalties when lim inf
Assuming that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties is a very mild assumption since it is automatically satisfied for every standard economy as defined below (see e.g. Araujo and Sandroni (1999) ). 
and the processes (A(ξ , j)) ξ >ξ 0 , (µ i (ξ , j)) ξ >ξ 0 and (G(ξ , j)) ξ ∈D are uniformly bounded from above, where
Remark 4.1. In a standard economy, one may have that current default penalties are time and state independent, i.e., µ i (ξ , j) = µ(j). In that case, assuming that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties does not impose any restriction on µ(j): it can be as large as desired. (M(ξ , j) ) ξ ∈D is uniformly bounded away from 0, then myopia implies uniform myopia. In particular, this is the case if we strengthen Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 by assuming the following properties.
Remark 4.2. If every process M(j) ≡
(A.1) The process Ω is uniformly bounded away from 0, i.e., there
exists Ω ∈ R L ++ such that Ω(ξ ) Ω for every ξ . (A.2) For every asset j, the process C (j) ≡ (C(ξ , j)) ξ ∈D is uniformly bounded from above, i.e., there exists
On the other hand, if every process M(j) is uniformly bounded from above then uniform myopia implies myopia. This is in particular the case if we impose the following additional assumption.
(A.3) For every asset j, the process C (j) of collateral requirements does not eventually vanish in the sense that there exists
Finally, if the process M(j) is uniformly bounded from above and away from 0, then the concepts of uniform myopia and myopia coincide. Uniform myopia is useful when we discuss issues regarding the implementation of our equilibrium concept (see Section 4.2).
When agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, any budget and physically feasible plan a ∈ B i (p, q, κ) ∩ F i has actually finite equivalent payoffs. This result will turn out to be crucial in the process of proving the existence of an equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs. 
Therefore there exists T 0 1 such that
Since agent i is myopic with respect to default penalties, there
Observe that the plan a satisfies
Moreover, for every τ T we have
It follows that for every τ T
Since T − 1 t, this implies that the plan a has finite equivalent payoffs.
Remark 4.3. Given Proposition 4.1 one may wonder whether restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs is relevant to the issue of existence. Since myopia implies that budget and physically feasible plans have finite equivalent payoffs, why one should impose any kind of debt constraints on available plans to ensure existence? The answer to this question lies on the fact that in decentralized economies, agents do not take into account feasibility restrictions when they solve their maximization problem. Only budgetary restrictions are relevant for them. But if this is the case, in the absence of borrowing constraints, agents can run a Ponzi scheme and equilibria may fail to exist. 
Implementation of equilibria with finite equivalent payoffs
The introduction of debt constraints raises issues related to the implementation of those constraints in decentralized anonymous markets. When there is no default penalty implementation is not an issue. Indeed, Proposition 3.3 states that in this case our constraints on plans are innocuous. 21 The case where default penalties are non-zero requires more elaboration.
When there is full commitment, Magill and Quinzii (1994) rule out Ponzi schemes by imposing implicit or explicit and nonbinding bounds on the real value of debt. They subsequently argue for either a subjective (self-monitoring) interpretation of implicit bounds or an objective (market-based) interpretation when bounds are explicit. We propose to show that in our context of limited commitment the same kind of interpretation applies. More precisely, we show that equilibria with finite equivalent payoffs are equilibria with implicit (or explicit and non-binding) bounds on short sales.
To prove our claim, we introduce first some notations. Given (p, q, κ) ) and all markets clear. We denote by Eq m (E) (Eq ∞ (E)) the set of all competitive equilibria with explicit bounds m (resp. implicit bounds) on short-selling.
The following proposition shows that, under uniform myopia with respect to default penalties, plans with implicit constraints on short-sales have finite equivalent payoffs.
22
Proposition 4.2. If agent i is uniformly myopic with respect to default penalties then every plan with implicit bounds on short-selling has finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., for every price process
We can now provide a formal proof of our claim: equilibria with finite equivalent payoffs are indeed equilibria with implicit (or explicit and non-binding) bounds on short sales. 
.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Let ((p, q, κ), a) be a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., ((p, q, κ), a) ∈ Eq ⋆ (E).
Given Proposition 4.2, to prove the corollary we only have to show that for every agent i, the plan a i belongs to B i m (p, q, κ) for every m m. Since the allocation a is physically feasible, we get that the process ϕ of short-sales satisfies
The desired result follows from Assumption 2.1 and condition (4.1).
Remark 4.4. It follows from the above arguments that if the bound m is such that m > m, then this bound is never binding at equilibrium.
Existence
The main contribution of this paper is the following existence result.
Theorem 4.1. If every agent is myopic with respect to default penalties, then a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs exists, i.e., Eq ⋆ (E) ̸ = ∅.
We propose a simple proof based on the standard ''truncation argument''.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For each τ ∈ T , we denote by E τ the truncation of the economy for which the final period is τ . Following the arguments in Páscoa and Seghir (2009), 23 it is possible to prove that under our set of assumptions, there exist a process of prices and delivery rates π τ = (p τ , q τ , κ τ ) and a process of plans
is a competitive equilibrium for the truncated economy E τ with ∥p τ (ξ )∥ m(ξ ) > 0 for some m(ξ ) that depends only on the primitives of the economy E (and is independent of the truncation size τ ). 24 We denote by clΞ the closure of Ξ under the weak topology. 25 Each process π τ belongs to clΞ which is weakly compact as a product of compact sets. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that the sequence (π τ ) τ ∈T converges to a process π = (p, q, κ) in clΞ . Observe that, for each node ξ ∈ D, we have ∥p(ξ )∥ m(ξ ) > 0. In particular, for each period t and every plan a ∈ A, the payoff Π i,t (p, a) is well defined. By feasibility at each node ξ , we get for each j
This implies that the sequence ( 
We claim that (π , a) is a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs for the economy E . It is straightforward to check that each plan a i belongs to the budget set B i (p, q, κ) and that the feasibility conditions (2.4)-(2.7) are satisfied. Applying Proposition 4.1, we get that the plan a i has finite equivalent payoffs. We propose now to prove that a i is optimal among plans with finite equivalent payoffs, i.e., the set Pref 
Since a i is physically feasible, we have x i (ξ ) Ω(ξ ) for every node ξ ∈ D. It follows from Assumptions (H.2) and (H.3) that
Since the plan a has finite equivalent payoffs, there exists
We denote by a the plan defined by
Observe that a belongs to the truncated budget set B i (p, q, κ) ∩ B T and satisfies
Combining (4.2)-(4.4) we get
Observe that  a ∈ F i (π , a i ). Moreover, we proved that there exists a strictly increasing sequence (T n ) n∈N with T n ∈ N such that 
Since T ν T , we have
It follows that
contradicting the optimality of a i ν in the truncated economy E T ν under the price process (p ν , q ν , κ ν ).
We have thus proved that for each i, the plan a i has finite equivalent payoffs and satisfies
This means that a i belongs to the demand set d i ⋆ (π ). We already proved that all markets clear. This means that (π , a) is a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs.
Given Proposition 3.3, we can obtain the main existence result in Araujo et al. (2002, Theorem 2) as a direct corollary of Theorem 4.1. (Araujo et al. (2002) ). If there is no default penalty, then there exists a competitive equilibrium, i.e., Eq(E ) ̸ = ∅.
Corollary 4.2
Remark 4.5. The proof of the above result proposed by Araujo et al. (2002) is different from ours. They also consider a sequence of equilibria for truncated economies and pass to the limit. However, to prove that the limit allocation is optimal, they follow a rather involved argument showing that the sequence of marginal utilities of income associated to the sequence of truncated equilibria is uniformly bounded.
Equilibrium refinement
In this section, we address an issue related to the indeterminacy of delivery rates in the definition of a competitive equilibrium. In a companion paper (see Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2011)), we have shown that for the two examples proposed in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) , no-trade is a possible equilibrium outcome. This is due to the fact that the standard equilibrium concept leaves room for spurious inactivity on asset markets due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. In the definition of a competitive equilibrium, the market clearing equation defining the delivery rate expected by lenders leaves its value undeterminate when there is no-trade at equilibrium. A similar issue was already pointed out by Dubey et al. (2005) . However, in their model it is easy to support equilibria with no-trade in the asset markets on account of absurdly pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. Indeed, if lenders expect assets to deliver nothing, then we can support any pure-spot equilibria by choosing the asset prices to be equal to zero. One may think that this problem does not arise anymore in the presence of collateral requirements since lenders rationally expect deliveries to be at least larger than the minimum between the promise and the value of the depreciated collateral. It is true that we cannot support pure-spot equilibria in a trivial manner as it is the case in Dubey et al. (2005) . However, spurious inactivity on asset markets due to overpessimistic expectations is still a problem even in the presence of collateral requirements. We propose to clarify this issue and explain how the refinement proposed by Dubey et al. (2005) can be adapted to our setting.
Let (π , (a i ) i∈I ) be a competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs where π = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ and a
the individual delivery rate defined by the equation (ξ , j) , is defined by the equation
As explained in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) 
In Dubey et al. (2005) , it is easy to support equilibria with notrade in the asset on account of absurdly pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. However, in a model with collateral requirements, it is not clear whether such equilibria can be supported. 28 In Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2011), we show that although agents expect per unit repayments K (ξ , j) to be strictly positive (actually above or equal to the minimum
there is still room for unduly pessimistic expectations that sustain equilibrium with no-trade. This raises an interesting issue. The equilibrium concept should be refined in order to rule out such pathological no-trade equilibria. We show below that the refinement procedure proposed by Dubey et al. (2005) can be easily adapted to our framework.
Following Dubey et al. (2005) , we propose an equilibrium refinement in which the government intervenes to sell infinitesimal quantities ε > 0 of each asset at each node and fully delivers on its promises. Since the government does not default, it does not 27 This is the reason why in our model we have chosen to parameterize agents' expectations about delivery by the average delivery rate above the minimum delivery, denoted by κ(ξ , j).
28 The intuition behind the existence of trivial equilibria in Dubey et al. (2005) is as follows. Consider a sequence of pure spot markets and an associated equilibrium.
Introduce next an asset j in node ξ − . Choose the repayment rate K (ξ , j) of the asset equal to zero and the price q(ξ − , j) equal to zero. Then no agent would have an incentive to trade in node ξ − . In a model with collateralized obligations this argument breaks down since K (ξ , j) must be larger than D(p, ξ , j)/V (p, ξ , j).
In case the asset's promise is larger than the depreciated value of the collateral, , j) ) and fixing the asset price q(ξ − , j) = p(ξ − )C(ξ − , j). No agent would have incentives to invest. Indeed, it would be better to buy the bundle C (ξ − , j) instead of one unit of the asset because of the utility obtained from consuming the collateral. However, it is not clear whether agents would have no incentives to sell the asset. It depends on whether the gain from consuming the collateral in node ξ − can compensate the future penalty suffered in case of default or the loss in consumption due to the repayment of debt besides the value of the depreciated collateral. need to constitute collateral bundles. However, since it delivers fully εV (p, ξ , j) but it gets delivered only εV (κ, p, ξ , j), on net the government injects the vector of commodities εb(κ, p, ξ , j)v(ξ ) where b(κ, p, ξ , j) 0 is defined by the equation
This touch of honesty banishes whimsical pessimism and rules out spurious inactivity on asset markets. We adapt the definition of a competitive equilibrium with the government intervention proposed by Dubey et al. (2005) to our framework.
Definition 5.1. An ε-equilibrium is a family π = (p, q, κ) ∈ Ξ of prices and delivery rates and an allocation (a i ) i∈I such that: (1) as in the standard competitive equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs, for every agent i the plan a i is optimal among the budget feasible plans and the asset market clears at every period; (2) different to the standard competitive equilibrium, commodity markets ε-clear, i.e., for every ξ ∈ D,
and delivery rates are boosted by the external agent, i.e., for every ξ > ξ 0 , 
where σ i (ξ , j) is agent i's individual delivery rate as defined by (5.1). The delivery rate κ(ξ , j) is the weighted average of individual rates and is boosted due to the fact that the government delivers fully on its promises. As the government intervention disappears, i.e., ε tends to 0, this boost disappears for periods where the asset is positively traded in the limit. Definition 5.2. A competitive equilibrium (π , (a i ) i∈I ) with finite equivalent payoffs is called a refined equilibrium if for every ε > 0 small enough there exists an ε-equilibrium (π (ε), (a i (ε)) i∈I ) such that lim ε→0 (π(ε), (a i (ε)) i∈I ) = (π , (a i ) i∈I ).
It is straightforward to adapt our arguments to obtain the existence (under standard assumptions) of an ε-equilibrium with finite equivalent payoffs. In order to prove that the limit (π , (a i ) i∈I )
is an equilibrium, the only difficulty is to show that the plan a i is optimal in the budget set defined by the price process π .
The arguments follow almost verbatim those in the proof of Theorem 4.1 and are based on the lower semi-continuity of the correspondence 
Conclusion
What makes general equilibrium models with collateral requirements (Araujo et al., 2002; Kubler and Schmedders, 2003) very appealing is that collateral constraints not only do exist in actual markets but also seem to be an efficient mechanism to preclude Ponzi schemes without imposing any ad-hoc constraint on debt. The recent contributions of Seghir (2009) and Ferreira and Torres-Martínez (2010) show that the positive results in Araujo et al. (2002) may not be robust: the effectiveness of collateral requirements to bound debt may not be valid anymore in the natural case where there are other mechanisms leading agents to overpay, that is, to repay more than the collateral when the value of their debt actually exceeds the collateral value.
To formally close the model and restore equilibrium, we need to impose borrowing constraints. Among the different approaches already existing in the literature with full commitment, we argue in favor of the endogenous debt constraints à la Levine and Zame (1996) . We introduce in the setting of Araujo et al. (2002) , Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of plans with finite equivalent payoffs. When payments are fully enforced, our concept of plans with finite equivalent payoffs coincides with the concept of plans with finitely effective debts introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) . When there are collateral requirements but no default penalties, any budget feasible plan has automatically finite equivalent payoffs. In particular, our budget set coincides with the standard one defined in Araujo et al. (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) . Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we show that restricting actions to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees equilibrium existence while keeping the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence result in Araujo et al. (2002) is a direct corollary of our existence result.
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